To what extent is the knowledge of God possible?

The question of whether, and specifically to what extent, knowledge of God is possible lies at the intersection of epistemology and philosophical theology – questioning the metaphysics of divine reality and its criteria for justified belief within human cognition. The issue, whether knowledge of God is possible, is approached through many rival accounts of ‘knowing’ what God would be rather than competing arguments ‘for’ God. In what follows, I will argue that knowledge of God is possible but only in part. This possibility I find accessible through many epistemic registers of reason, faith, and revelation but is limited by content, accessibility, and necessity. These limitations sustain the idea that the fullest extent of knowledge of God is not and cannot be possible, which Descartes might posit through his developments of apodictic knowledge towards God - attempting to maximise the epistemic strength through the necessity of God as a foundation for all truth. Instead, I would sympathise most with the approach of John Locke, who allowed for ‘intuitive knowledge of our own existence.’ Locke’s thesis on the possible extent of the knowledge of God is partial in nature – he does not push knowledge of God towards the notion of apodictic knowledge as Descartes would and crucially does not fall into scepticism or excessive individualism and subjectivity as Kierkegaard might. Locke holds an appealing middle ground between these varying interpretations and allows for God to be known genuinely, close but not to the extent of wholly certain knowledge. Descartes’ claim that ‘absolute certainty’ can be achieved by beginning from radical doubt means that he asserts that we, as humans, can know God indubitably. He arrives at this through necessity provided by the method of doubt. This method, as explained in Meditations, uses doubt to eliminate any conditional knowledge, establishing God as both certain and a condition of certainty itself. All other access to knowledge, following a Cartesian view, is suspended from truth, deemed potentially deceivable. This is what is meant by his apodictic certainty. Locke seeks to depict the extent to which knowledge of God is possible through first investigating what is deemed as ‘knowledge of God.’ Locke asserts that for proper knowledge of God to be gained, a combination of what he deems certain knowledge accessible through natural theology as well as the input of faith and revelation must be utilised to gain knowledge of God himself. He defines knowledge solely as a perception or a seeing, the difference between degrees of knowledge reflected as difference in the immediacy and clearness of the perception . By this, Locke means that for one to know, one must perceive and have the available capacity to connect ideas. This account of knowledge from Locke seems on its own to be grounded in certainty and if applied to the knowledge of God, would be progressing towards a likeness to apodictic knowledge. Locke regards this knowledge, functioning through reason, to be the primary source of adjudication with faith as a rational assent which follows when revelation is evidentially secure in supplying content. Locke is presented particularly strictly from an evidentialist perspective. Locke’s standard of religious understanding must require evidential grounding as the mind must ‘proceed rationally’ if knowledge is to be grounded. Locke presents knowledge in degrees. For certain knowledge, evidence supplied must entail empirically verifiable truth as Locke appeals to the use of human faculties of sense. For evidence that can only make truth probable, one obtains only rational belief. In this degree of knowledge, belief in revealed religion falls. Locke is not stating that Christian revelations can count as strict and certain knowledge to the same extent of intuitive and demonstrative knowledge. Examples of intuitive knowledge would include mathematical truths such as three is greater than two or the existence of self as presented by Descartes’ method of doubt. Examples of demonstrative knowledge would be Mathematical proofs such as Pythagoras’ theorem or logical deductions of humans possessing mortality. I find it appealing that Locke has not likened revelation to what he deems as reasonable knowledge such as the existence of God which would be demonstrative knowledge as reason could be used to work through to completed proof. In this way, I find that Locke’s rational and evidential grounding is strong as it removes any uncertainty through faith being supplemented to provide the rational assent necessary for grounded knowledge in probability. Where natural theology can demonstrate religious truth, Locke accepts certain knowledge such as the existence of God. What concerns God in revealed religion is governed by rational faith instead of certain knowledge. The limitations of Locke arise when considering the other aspects of the knowledge of God – faith and revelation. I find that this is necessary within Locke’s framework to consolidate the centrality of reason, maintaining his strongest grounding, however these should still be considered to shed light on Locke’s superiority as more argumentatively sound than Descartes. Locke finds that faith is grounded in assent, specifically in a religious manner. He distinguishes this assent from knowledge as assent can accept propositions as true without direct perception or ‘inducements,’ as referenced in Essay. Through this distinction, Locke uses faith intertwined with reason, stating that reason is the ‘discovery of the certainty or probability of such propositions or truths’ that the mind arrives at through ‘deductions made from such ideas it has got through the use of its natural faculties.’ Locke avoids being a ‘fideist’ as he continues to hold faith to rational assessment with faith being presented as ‘nothing else but an assent founded on the highest reason’. The emphasis Locke places on maintaining rational reasoning strengthens his belief and understanding in God which ‘cannot deceive.’ Therefore, within his framework, faith has a dependent role on reason along with revelation. Kierkegaard, contrary to Locke, posits that faith requires objective uncertainty. This would argue against not only Descartes’ certainty but also Locke’s partial knowledge secured evidentially as Kierkegaard states that this would destroy faith’s religious character. Kierkegaard believes that ‘faith is precisely the contradiction between the infinite passion of the individual’s inwardness and objective uncertainty.’ This shows his more inward consideration of faith which juxtaposes Locke’s more outward expressions. Kierkegaard insists that without ‘holding fast the objective uncertainty,’ one cannot preserve themselves in faith. Therefore, what Locke holds centrally to his account of the knowledge of God possible – reason – Kierkegaard denies completely in the context of contributing to the Christian faith, which I find reduces his epistemic reliability as a crucial shortcoming. Kierkegaard develops on his interpretation of objective knowledge, against Locke and Descartes, as he states that truth is to be based on subjectivity however Hamilton comments that this then ‘involves the complete rejection of any metaphysical claims concerning God’s existence.’ This, I find, strays too close to losing genuine divine knowledge as Kierkegaard risks weakening objectivity in knowledge excessively to focus on an existential dimension of the divine. Kierkegaard’s focus on the subjective pushed the truth to be dependent more on the inward state of the believer than on the truth of what is believed. I find this approach to be unreliable in grounding standards of divine knowledge as epistemologically; one can mistakenly deem truth in falseness by virtue of passion or sincerity. As a result of this, I find Kierkegaard’s argument rendered weaker than Locke’s. Locke uses revelation to provide evidence for most religious belief, supported by natural theology – truths of God available by reason alone; foundational, evidential knowledge of God. He uses revelation to provide more extensive knowledge of God which extends belief of God further than what reason alone can justify. This use of revelation extends the scope of the knowledge of God but only within the bounds of reason certifying its credentials. Revelations can be seen most crucially through the miracles, acting as key public evidence. Locke goes so far as to say miracles are ‘the only means God is conceived to have to satisfy men, as rational creatures, of the certainty of anything he would reveal, as coming from himself’ (Rockwood). This claim cements the great but not whole extent of Locke’s presented knowledge of God. This is not a claim of miracles and revelation being substitutes for reason but instead providing evidence for God which reason evaluates. From this, the epistemic order can be shown with reason governing the extent of possible knowledge of God, revelation in a secondary and supplementary role and finally faith as a means of appropriating knowledge through rational assent. Kierkegaard’s approach on the possible extent of the knowledge of God can be used here to defend Locke against the excessive rationalism argued for by Descartes. Kierkegaard posits that it is wrong for the knowledge of God to be considered possible to the fullest extent as the divine is argued to exceed purely rational capture. He explains this aptly as ‘if he does exist, then it is foolishness to want to demonstrate it.’ From this view, it can be supported that full extent of certainty regarding God is wrong and impossible. However, I would argue that Kierkegaard goes too far to suggest that rational justification is misguided in use here. The extent of possible knowledge of God depends on the standards of knowledge consistent with sustained faith and revelation. Locke’s superiority remains as he preserves the possibility of genuine knowledge of God but in a measured manner as to sustain religious belief without fragile inwardness. His framework answers the question most convincingly as it remains modest in its determinations of possible knowledge – human minds are understood to have the capacity to grasp the divine, only not to an exhaustively comprehensive manner, but can grasp, nonetheless. This partial approach allows for divine truths to be affirmed in a non-reductive yet accountably genuine manner. In this way, Locke’s framework illustrating the extent to which knowledge of God is possible is, in my opinion, most agreeable.